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Wonky Walden: The Dizzying New Personal 
Jurisdiction Rule 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Even prior to Walden v. Fiore, determining if a court had 
authority over an out-of-state defendant was a “labyrinth with no 
exit.”1 Over the years, that labyrinth has mutated. Born of federalist 
principles in the 1870s, personal jurisdiction analysis has long since 
shifted toward ensuring defendants’ due process rights.2 With its 
evolving core purpose, it is little wonder that nailing down 
appropriate applications on the fringes is difficult. 
Consistent with this difficulty, some commentators have 
criticized the United States Supreme Court as “incapable of 
providing a coherent vision of the law of personal jurisdiction,”3 
crediting the Court for producing “an ever-widening doctrinal 
morass” where “fundamental principles [are] submerged beneath 
mechanistic formulas that are both too broad and too narrow.”4 As a 
result, due process has become “nothing more than a complex web 
of fact-specific outcomes.”5 
Walden v. Fiore is the court’s most recent foray into this morass. 
No one claims that Walden clarifies the personal jurisdiction 
conundrum; at best, the case is seen as a dud.6 But Walden is not a 
dud. Walden injects dizzying twists and turns into the minimum 
contacts maze.7 First, Walden has compounded any pre-existing 
complexity concerning the proper roles of plaintiff residency and 
damage location.8 Second, Walden’s express language contradicts 
 
 1. See generally Simona Grossi, Personal Jurisdiction: A Doctrinal Labyrinth with No 
Exit, 47 AKRON L. REV. 617, 618 (2014). 
 2. Paul J. Stancil, Walden v. Fiore - Post-Argument, SCOTUSCAST (Dec. 13, 2013), 
www.fed-soc.org/multimedia/detail/walden-v-fiore-post-argument-scotuscast. 
 3. E.g. Grossi, supra note 1, at 618. 
 4. Id. 
 5. Id. at 637. 
 6. See infra Part VI. 
 7. See infra Part III. 
 8. Id. 
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commonsensical trends toward expanded personal jurisdiction, 
inviting courts to err on the side of denying personal jurisdiction.9 
The world is shrinking. Advances in technology and 
transportation are dissolving interstate jurisdictional burdens.10 These 
advances had naturally lent to expanding state power to pull in out-
of-staters to protect resident people and property.11 Then 
Walden appeared. 
This Note exposes Walden’s unappreciated mess. Part II 
addresses how Walden should have come out differently under 
precedent. Part III showcases the disarray that is Walden’s new 
personal jurisdiction rule. Part IV highlights the failure of lower 
courts to appreciate Walden’s departure from the previously 
understood role of plaintiff residency and damage location in 
jurisdictional analysis. Part V recommends a return to pre-Walden 
analysis—the lesser of evils—and bolsters that argument by looking 
to the domestic doctrines of other Western countries, specifically 
Canada and England. Part VI concludes. 
II. PRE-WALDEN ANALYSIS APPLIED TO WALDEN 
The Court in Walden v. Fiore did not find personal jurisdiction to 
exist in Nevada when Georgia officers allegedly intentionally 
confiscated and unlawfully delayed the return of thousands of dollars 
by falsifying an affidavit when they knew or should have known the 
money rightfully belonged to Nevada gamblers, and consequently 
 
 9. Id. 
 10. Gray v. Am. Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 176 N.E.2d 761, 765–66 (Ill. 
1961) (“[T]oday’s facilities for transportation and communication have removed much of the 
difficulty and inconvenience formerly encountered in defending lawsuits brought in 
other States.”). 
 11. See id. at 766 (“Unless they are applied in recognition of the changes brought about 
by technological and economic progress, jurisdictional concepts which may have been 
reasonable enough in a simpler economy lose their relation to reality, and injustice rather than 
justice is promoted. Our unchanging principles of justice, whether procedural or substantive in 
nature, should be scrupulously observed by the courts. But the rules of law which grow and 
develop within those principles must do so in the light of the facts of economic life as it is lived 
today. Otherwise the need for adaptation may become so great that basic rights are sacrificed 
in the name of reform, and the principles themselves become impaired.”). 
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could not be used in Nevada or anywhere else over the course of 
seven months.12 
If the Supreme Court had simply followed precedent—as it 
claimed it did13—the Court would likely have found the defendant to 
have sufficient minimum contacts. First, it appears that the officers 
who allegedly created the false affidavit knew the gamblers’ Nevada 
residency by the time they falsified the document. Second, the 
resulting delay in the return of the gamblers’ cash caused foreseeable 
harm in Nevada. 
A. Pre-Walden Tortious Minimum Contacts Analysis Counted 
Contacts with State Residents and Damage Location 
Prior to Walden v. Fiore, it was well accepted, even at the 
Supreme Court itself, that plaintiff residency was not only a relevant 
but a potentially pivotal part of the minimum contacts inquiry for 
intentional torts. While plaintiff residency alone has not been 
determinative, there is little doubt that plaintiff residency had the 
power to push the minimum contacts pendulum toward personal 
jurisdiction—especially when that residency was known and the 
ultimate damages took place in the residency state. 
Perhaps the most striking proof that plaintiff residency matters in 
tort minimum contacts analysis is the following line from Calder v. 
Jones, a case quoted several times in Walden: “[P]etitioners are 
primary participants in an alleged wrongdoing intentionally directed 
at a California resident, and jurisdiction over them is proper on 
that basis.”14 
In Calder, two employees of a national magazine company who 
resided in Florida helped publish an allegedly libelous story about a 
California resident.15 The employees challenged a California court’s 
personal jurisdiction over them because neither was in California at 
 
 12. Walden v. Fiore, 134 S. Ct. 1115, 1119–26 (2014); Fiore v. Walden, 657 F.3d 838, 
842–60 (9th Cir. 2011). 
 13. See Walden, 134 S. Ct. at 1126 (“Well-established principles of personal jurisdiction 
are sufficient to decide this case.”). 
 14. Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783, 790 (1984) (emphasis added). However, the Walden 
court chose never to grapple directly with that particular line, instead selectively pointing to 
Calder’s language favorable to Walden’s change in jurisdictional direction. 
 15. Id. at 785–86. 
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any time for any activity related to the claims brought against them.16 
However, the Supreme Court found both employees had minimum 
contacts with California “such that the maintenance of the suit [did] 
not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice,”17 
relying heavily on the fact that the out-of-state conduct was aimed at 
a California resident.18 
Calder also provides evidence of the importance of the location 
of tortious conduct’s “effects” or injury. In addition to Calder’s 
finding that jurisdiction was proper based on plaintiff residency,19 the 
Court also found it proper based on the damage location: 
“Jurisdiction over petitioners is therefore proper in California based 
on the ‘effects’ of their Florida conduct in California.”20 The Court 
did not find that all of the effects of the out-of-state conduct 
occurred in the forum, but instead that “the brunt of the harm, in 
terms both of respondent’s emotional distress and the injury to her 
professional reputation, was suffered in California.”21 
The same year as Calder, the Court took another opportunity to 
establish the relevance of damage location while also reiterating the 
proper role of the plaintiff ’s residency. 
The plaintiff ’s residence is not, of course, completely irrelevant to 
the jurisdictional inquiry. As noted, that inquiry focuses on the 
relations among the defendant, the forum, and the litigation. 
Plaintiff ’s residence may well play an important role in determining 
the propriety of entertaining a suit against the defendant in the 
forum. That is, plaintiff ’s residence in the forum may, because of 
defendant’s relationship with the plaintiff, enhance defendant’s 
contacts with the forum. Plaintiff ’s residence may be the focus of 
the activities of the defendant out of which the suit arises.22 
 
 16. Id. 
 17. Id. at 788–89 (citing Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945)) 
(internal quotation marks omitted). 
 18. Id. at 789–90. 
 19. Id. at 790. 
 20. Id. at 789; see also Gray Am. Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 176 N.E.2d 761, 
762–63 (Ill. 1961) (“It is well established, however, that in law the place of a wrong is where 
the last event takes place which is necessary to render the actor liable [i.e., damage].”). 
 21. Calder, 465 U.S at 789. 
 22. Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 465 U.S. 770, 780 (1984); Calder, 465 U.S. at 
788–89; McGee v. Int’l Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220 (1957). See also William J. Knudsen, Jr.’s 
interpretation of Keeton in his article, Keeton, Calder, Helicopteros and Burger King—
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Though dicta, that explanation from Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, 
Inc. is perhaps the Supreme Court’s clearest articulation of the role 
of plaintiff residency in minimum contacts analysis.23 According to 
Keeton—another tort case concerning not only non-resident 
defendants but also a non-resident plaintiff—plaintiff residency in 
the chosen forum is not strictly required, but when present, it should 
be relevant and sometimes even weighty.24 
Regarding damage location, Keeton gave weight even when “the 
bulk of the harm done . . . occurred outside [the forum state].”25 
The fact that the suit was, “at least in part, for damages suffered in 
[the forum state],” played an important role in the Court’s analysis 
because “it is beyond dispute that [the forum state] has a significant 
interest in redressing injuries that actually occur within the State.”26 
The fact of partial damages within the forum state did not alone 
justify personal jurisdiction, but when combined with the 
defendant’s “regular circulation of magazines in the forum State,” it 
was sufficient.27 
A year after Calder and Keeton, the Court again affirmed the 
relevance of plaintiff residency to minimum contacts analysis, this 
time beyond the realm of torts. In Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 
an out-of-state franchisee allegedly wrongfully terminated a contract 
with its franchisor.28 The Court found minimum contacts to be 
 
International Shoe’s Most Recent Progeny, 39 U. MIAMI L. REV. 809, 817 (1985). 
“[P]laintiff’s residence may cause insufficient contacts to be ‘enhanced’ so that they meet 
constitutional standards. In other words, in a close case, plaintiff’s residence could tip the 
scales in favor of jurisdiction.” Id. Knudsen also points out a clear example where plaintiff 
residency tipped the scales. Id. at 817–18 (“McGee . . . is a perfect example of such 
enhancement because the contacts of defendant insurance company in that case were as 
minimal as may be found in any case where the Supreme Court has upheld jurisdiction. The 
use of McGee in recognizing the significance of plaintiff’s residence as a factor in the 
jurisdictional analysis makes good sense.”). 
 23.  Knudsen, supra note 22, at 817–18. (“The Court has, of course, discussed this 
factor [plaintiff residency] before in Kulko, World-Wide Volkswagen, and Rush, but never to the 
extent it has in Keeton. Whether Keeton’s clearer articulation of the role of plaintiff’s residence 
represents a step forward in jurisdictional analysis, however, is not entirely certain.”). 
 24. Keeton, 465 U.S. at 780 (“[P]laintiff’s residence in the forum State is not a separate 
requirement, and lack of residence will not defeat jurisdiction established on the basis of 
defendant’s contacts.”). 
 25. Id. 
 26. Id. at 776. 
 27. Id. at 773. 
 28. Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 466 (1985). 
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satisfied because “the defendant [had] ‘purposefully directed’ his 
activities at residents of the forum [i.e., the franchisor], and the 
litigation result[ed] from alleged injuries that ‘[arose] out of or 
relate[d] to’ those activities.”29 While a contract case, the Burger 
King Court suggested via dicta that the purposeful direction 
standard could also apply in tort claims.30 Likely, implied in 
purposeful direction is that the alleged victim’s residency is known, 
or at least has reason to be known, to the defendant at the time of 
the act. Burger King did not suggest that plaintiff residency should 
always receive much weight, explicitly rejecting the haling of a 
defendant “into a jurisdiction solely as a result of random, fortuitous, 
or attenuated contacts.”31 Thus, it makes sense for unknown plaintiff 
residency or residency resulting from unilateral acts after injury to 
play little-to-no role in minimum contacts analysis.32 
Through Calder, Keeton, and Burger King, the Supreme Court 
made clear the relevance of known plaintiff residency and foreseeable 
damage location to minimum contacts analysis and the ultimate 
sufficiency of the two when combined. In the nearly three decades 
since, the combined personal jurisdiction perspective of these three 
cases had gone utterly unchallenged.33 
B. How Walden Likely Comes Out Under the Pre-Walden Standard 
Under the pre-Walden standard, the Court should likely have 
found the officers who allegedly created the false affidavit to have 
sufficient minimum contacts with Nevada. First, it appears that the 
officers knew of the gamblers’ Nevada residency at least by the time 
 
 29. Id. at 472 (emphasis added) (internal citations omitted). 
 30. Regarding product liability, “[a] forum State does not exceed its powers under the 
Due Process Clause if it asserts personal jurisdiction over a corporation that delivers its 
products into the stream of commerce with the expectation that they will be purchased by 
consumers in the forum State and those products subsequently injure forum consumers.” Id. 
at 473 (internal quotations omitted). Regarding defamation, “a publisher who distributes 
magazines in a distant State may fairly be held accountable in that forum for damages resulting 
there from an allegedly defamatory story.” Id. (citing Keeton, 465 U.S. at 774; Calder v. Jones, 
465 U.S. 783 (1984)). 
 31. Id. at 475 (internal quotations omitted). 
 32. Indeed, as far back as 1958, the Court has found “unilateral activity of those who 
claim some relationship with a nonresident defendant cannot satisfy the requirement of contact 
with the forum State.” Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 254 (1958). 
 33. LexisNexis Shephard’s® report run by author on December 12, 2014. 
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of the falsification. Second, injury flowing from the delay in the 
return of the gamblers’ cash occurred in Nevada. 
1. Walden’s basic facts 
Professional gamblers accused DEA agents of wrongfully seizing 
$97,000 of their money while making a connecting flight at a 
Georgia airport.34 At the time of the seizure, the pair was returning 
home to Nevada.35 They allegedly told the officers where they were 
headed, though they displayed non-Nevada drivers’ licenses.36 The 
gamblers alleged “the funds were readily identifiable [as] originating 
and returning to Las Vegas” to their bank that ordinarily holds their 
gambling money.37 Soon after returning home, the gamblers said 
they produced proof of their money’s legitimacy, forwarding that 
proof from Las Vegas to the agents.38 The gamblers also claimed that 
“[a]ll defendants recognized at all times that the destination of the 
funds at the time of the seizure was . . . Nevada, and that a 
substantial amount of the currency had also originated . . . [in] 
Nevada.”39 The officers also allegedly ran background checks of the 
gamblers, “searching data bases compiled and maintained 
in Nevada.”40 
The gamblers further alleged that the officers falsified an affidavit 
which unjustly delayed the cash’s rightful return until seven months 
after its initial seizure.41 
Specifically, Fiore and Gipson allege in the complaint that this 
probable cause affidavit falsely stated that Gipson had been 
uncooperative and had refused to respond to questions; that Fiore 
and Gipson had given inconsistent answers during questioning; and 
that there was sufficient evidence for probable cause to forfeit the 
funds as drug proceeds.42 
 
 34. Fiore v. Walden, 657 F.3d 838, 842–45 (9th Cir. 2011). 
 35. Id. at 846, 850. 
 36. Id. 
 37. Id. at 850. 
 38. Id. 
 39. Id. at 851. 
 40. Id. 
 41. Id. at 844. 
 42. Id. 
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Additionally, the gamblers alleged the agents failed to mention 
pertinent exculpatory evidence in the affidavit: 
. . . that Fiore and Gipson had no history of unlawful drug use or 
trade; that they had documentation showing them to be advantage 
gamblers; that their bags had passed through an agricultural x-ray 
and other inspections used for contraband detection without 
incident; that Fiore and Gipson had provided actual receipts for 
most of the funds that they carried; and that the $30,000 Gipson 
was carrying could be traced directly to a legal source, his winnings 
at El San Juan Casino.43 
2. Pre-Walden law applied to Walden 
There is “some general agreement” that likely the most relevant 
precedential test came from Calder v. Jones.44 According to Calder, 
“personal jurisdiction may be determined based on a three-part test: 
(1) the defendant committed an intentional act; (2) the act was 
aimed at the forum state; and (3) the harm caused would be 
experienced in the forum state.”45 
Just like in Calder, where magazine employees “[were] primary 
participants in an alleged wrongdoing intentionally directed at a 
California resident, and jurisdiction over them [was] proper on that 
basis,”46 the DEA agents were primary participants in “alleged 
wrongdoing intentionally directed”47 at Nevada residents. Thus, 
Nevada jurisdiction over them should likely be “proper on 
that basis.”48 
If at the time of the initial seizure of the gamblers’ money in an 
Atlanta airport the officers had no knowledge of the gamblers’ 
 
 43. Id. 
 44. Stephen Wermiel, SCOTUS for law students (sponsored by Bloomberg Law): Gambling 
on personal jurisdiction, SCOTUSBLOG (Nov. 1, 2013, 11:41 AM), 
www.scotusblog.com/2013/11/scotus-for-law-students-sponsored-by-bloomberg-law-
gambling-on-personal-jurisdiction/ (“There is some general agreement that the relevant test 
comes from the 1984 Supreme Court decision in Calder v. Jones”). 
 45. Id. 
 46. Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783, 790 (1984) (emphasis added). However, the Walden 
court chose never to grapple directly with that particular line, instead selectively pointing to 
Calder’s language favorable to Walden’s change in jurisdictional direction. 
 47. Id. 
 48. Id. 
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Nevada residency,49 it is difficult to argue the officers at that time 
aimed their conduct at Nevada—a forum then unknown. However, 
by the time of the drafting of the allegedly false affidavit, the officers 
“definitely knew . . . that [the gamblers] had a significant connection 
to Nevada.”50 
First, at the time of the seizure, the pair told the officers they 
were heading to Nevada, and their tickets should have confirmed 
that fact.51 Second, the cash is described as “identifiable [as] 
originating and returning to Las Vegas.”52 Third, soon after 
returning to Nevada, the gamblers supposedly “forwarded” their 
supporting documents from Las Vegas.53 Fourth, the agents 
themselves allegedly searched “data bases compiled and maintained 
in Nevada”54 to find out more about the gamblers. Taking those 
allegations as true, it is quite likely the agents had a fair idea which 
state the gamblers belonged to at the time. Therefore, the contact 
the agents had with Nevada through its residents by way of the 
affidavit was anything other than “random, fortuitous, 
or attenuated.”55 
In other words, like the corporation in Burger King which, in 
part, “‘purposefully directed’ . . . activities at residents of the forum” 
by way of a contract,56 the agents purposefully directed activities at 
residents of Nevada by way of an affidavit. By the time of the 
affidavit, the agents likely knew to which state the gamblers 
belonged. Though the affidavit did not create an ongoing 
relationship like the contract in Burger King, the affidavit should still 
be a relevant contact. And, just like in Burger King, where the 
alleged damages related to the purposeful direction—the contractual 
 
 49. Fiore v. Walden, 657 F.3d 838, 862 (9th Cir. 2011) (Ikuta, J., dissenting) (“[W]hen 
Walden seized the cash, he knew only that the plaintiffs had California driver’s licenses and 
were headed to Las Vegas. The complaint does not even hint that Walden learned of plaintiffs’ 
ties to Las Vegas until after the seizure was complete.”). 
 50. Id. at 850. 
 51. Id. at 850, 853. 
 52. Id. at 850. 
 53. Id. 
 54. Id. at 851. 
 55. Walden v. Fiore, 134 S. Ct. 1115, 1123 (2014) (quoting Burger King Corp. v. 
Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 475 (1985)). 
 56. Burger King, 471 U.S. at 472, 479–80 (emphasis added) (citation omitted). 
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relationship—the bulk of the damages to the gamblers flows directly 
from the purposeful direction—the affidavit. 
Moreover, just like in Calder, where the Court also found 
jurisdiction proper “based on the ‘effects’ of . . . Florida conduct in 
California,”57 the Court should have found jurisdiction over the 
agents proper based on the effects of Georgia conduct in Nevada. 
Arguably, the “brunt of the harm” 58 flowing from the alleged 
wrongful detainment and the delayed return to the cash’s rightful 
owners in Nevada occurred in Nevada, where the gamblers would 
have most likely spent that money. But even if the “brunt of the 
harm” was not felt in Nevada as in Calder,59 at the very least “part” 
of the harm occurred there as in Keeton.60 While the location of 
“part” of the damages was not alone sufficient in Keeton, it did 
suffice in the presence of other factors.61 Here, the known residency 
of the Nevada gamblers could potentially be an augmenting factor.62 
Unsurprisingly, the Ninth Circuit found that Nevada courts had 
specific personal jurisdiction over the agents, hinging its decision on 
“key facts” which included the fact that the agents had allegedly 
wronged Nevada residents who were returning home.63 The agents 
knew that the travelers were Nevada residents and that Nevada was 
 
 57. Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783, 789 (1984). 
 58. Id. (stating that one of the reasons the court had jurisdiction is because “the brunt 
of the harm . . . was suffered in California”). 
 59. Id. 
 60. Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 465 U.S. 770, 776 (1984). 
 61. Id. at 773–74. 
 62. The following is helpful way of summarizing the most convincing arguments for 
Nevada jurisdiction over the agents in this case: 
Jurisdiction arises from the fact that petitioner, knowing that respondents were 
Nevada residents and having received exculpatory evidence from them in Nevada, 
submitted a false affidavit that prevented the return of funds money to them in 
Nevada. There is no question that this conduct caused injury, which obviously was 
suffered somewhere. That place certainly was not Georgia; by the time petitioner 
wrote his affidavit, respondents had long since departed Atlanta and were, instead, 
back at home in Nevada. The only sensible place to locate the occurrence of the 
injury is where respondents were living and working during the time in which they 
were deprived of their funds. That rule is easy enough to administer and avoids the 
prospect of giving plaintiffs an unlimited choice of fora. 
Brief for Respondent at 43, Walden v. Fiore, 134 S. Ct. 1115 (2014) (No. 12-574). 
 63. Fiore v. Walden, 657 F.3d 838, 848 (9th Cir. 2011). 
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their final destination.64 Thus, “[the agents’] actions were 
‘performed with the purpose of having’ its ‘consequences felt’ by 
someone in [Nevada].”65 In other words, the Ninth Circuit 
appropriately applied Supreme Court precedent. It is true that the 
Supreme Court had not yet heard a case quite like the gamblers’, but 
there is no meaningful minimum contacts distinction between 
Calder and this case, except perhaps that the relationship and harm 
began in Georgia. At its core, the allegedly falsified affidavit was not 
a far cry from Calder’s defamatory article. Both concerned the 
communication of lies that caused damage in a predictable forum.66 
Though Justice Ikuta dissented from the Ninth Circuit’s 
opinion, her dissatisfaction with the plurality’s opinion was that she 
did not see the falsification of the affidavit and its resulting delay in 
the return of funds as a cognizable tort.67 The only possible tortious 
conduct Justice Ikuta saw in the case was the initial seizure of the 
funds.68 To that conduct—and that conduct alone—she applied the 
same minimum contacts standard as the majority: 
In determining whether the defendant “purposefully directed” the 
activities which are the subject of plaintiff ’s claim to the forum 
state, we consider whether the defendant “(1) committed an 
intentional act, (2) expressly aimed at the forum state, (3) causing 
harm that the defendant knows is likely to be suffered in the 
forum state.”69 
From the perspective of the initial seizure, she found no express 
aiming because “[a]s a matter of simple logic, a defendant cannot 
‘expressly aim’ an intentional act at a victim’s home state if the 
 
  64. Id. at 843 (“When asked for identification, Fiore and Gipson showed their 
California drivers’ licenses and stated that they had California residences, as well as residences in 
Las Vegas. They further informed the DEA agents ‘that Las Vegas was the final destination of 
most if not all of the funds in their possession’ and that they were returning to their Las Vegas 
residences.”) (emphasis added). 
 65. Id. at 851 (quoting Ibrahim v. Dep’t Homeland Sec., 538 F.3d 1250, 1259 (9th 
Cir. 2008)). 
 66. Though one notable difference is that with the defamatory article all that was 
wrongfully taken was someone’s intangible reputation, whereas with the affidavit, the taking of 
tangible property was perpetuated. 
 67. See Fiore, 657 F.3d at 860, 863 (Ikuta, J., dissenting). 
 68. See id. 
 69. Id. at 862 (quoting Dole Food Co., Inc. v. Watts, 303 F.3d 1104, 1111 (9th 
Cir. 2002)). 
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defendant committing the action does not even know that the victim 
has any connection with that state.”70 At the time of the seizure, the 
agents likely did not know the gamblers’ ties to Nevada, and, 
therefore, could not have aimed at Nevada at that time, according to 
Justice Ikuta.71 However, if Justice Ikuta had also applied her 
standard to the later conduct of the affidavit, thereby recognizing 
that act as a recoverable part of the gamblers’ grievance, she would 
have had little, if any, basis for her dissent. 
Under established precedent,72 the Court should have held that 
the officers who allegedly created a false affidavit causing the delayed 
return of the gamblers’ funds constituted sufficient minimum 
contacts with Nevada. First, the officers likely knew the gamblers’ 
Nevada residency—at least by the time of the affidavit. Second, at 
least some of the injury caused by the affidavit-induced delay 
occurred in Nevada. 
III. WALDEN’S INCOMPREHENSIBLE RULE  
The new rule coming out of Walden is not as clear-cut as it 
initially may seem; in fact, in the greater context of the entire ruling, 
Walden’s minimum contacts rule for intentional torts is 
incomprehensible: “The proper focus of the ‘minimum contacts’ 
inquiry in intentional-tort cases is ‘the relationship among the 
defendant, the forum, and the litigation.’ . . . And it is the 
 
 70. Id. 
 71. Id. 
 72. Given the shakiness of the Supreme Court’s ruling, it is easy to speculate that other 
arguments that did not make it into the opinion itself drove the decision-making. One such 
possibility is that a special interest—specifically government agents—was the target of the 
litigation. 
The Solicitor General filed a brief urging the Court to reject the Ninth Circuit 
standard and [took] part in the oral argument. A number of states also filed a friend-
of-the-court brief warning that the Ninth Circuit’s approach would make law 
enforcement officers subject to lawsuits in states with which they have no real 
connection and in which defending against claims will be extremely inconvenient, 
costly, and unpredictable. 
Wermiel, supra note 44. “The personal jurisdiction question likely has broad[] implications for 
litigation throughout the country, and especially for members of law enforcement (whose 
concerns are aired by several amici on Walden’s side, including the United States).” William 
Baude, Argument preview: Where can a federal agent be sued?, SCOTUSBLOG (Oct. 30, 2013, 
3:49 PM), www.scotusblog.com/2013/10/argument-preview-where-can-a-federal-agent-be-
sued/; see also Stancil, supra note 2. 
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defendant, not the plaintiff or third parties, who must create contacts 
with the forum State.”73 Commentators have attempted their “Plain 
English” summary in the following way: 
[Y]ou cannot force somebody to travel to a far-off place to litigate 
a case if they have no connection to that place. If you want to sue 
somebody in a particular state, you need to show that they have 
made contact with the state — either by committing an act in that 
state, or at least by intentionally reaching out to the state somehow. 
But you cannot sue them simply because you live in the state and 
you have been hurt.74 
This thousand-foot view of Walden’s rule makes it seem like 
nothing but a regurgitation of precedent; however, problems abound 
in the willows. First, Walden leaves ambiguity about the role—if 
any—plaintiff residency has in the minimum contacts analysis. 
Second, Walden tries in vain to draw an impenetrable line between 
state contacts and contacts with state residents harmed within 
their state. 
A. Walden’s Mixed Messages About the Relevance of Plaintiff 
Residency 
Walden leaves us with a grab bag of contradictory statements 
regarding the role of plaintiff residency in minimum contacts 
analysis. Walden first pronounces that plaintiff residency has no place 
in the discussion, even when that residency is known. But in the 
same breath, Walden suggests plaintiff residency is in fact relevant to, 
even if not independently sufficient for, minimum contacts analysis. 
On the one hand, Walden holds that plaintiff residency—even if 
known to defendant at the commission of a tort—is not a minimum 
contacts consideration. First, Walden states, “[M]inimum contacts 
analysis looks to the defendant’s contacts with the forum State itself, 
not the defendant’s contacts with persons who reside there.”75 The Court 
then goes so far as to say that “when viewed through the proper 
 
 73. Walden v. Fiore, 134 S. Ct. 1115, 1126 (2014) (citing Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 
783, 788 (1984)) (citation omitted). 
 74. William Baude, Opinion analysis: The boundaries of specific jurisdiction, 
SCOTUSBLOG (Feb. 26, 2014, 2:37 PM), www.scotusblog.com/2014/02/opinion-analysis-
the-boundaries-of-specific-jurisdiction/ [hereinafter Baude, Boundaries]. 
 75. Walden, 134 S. Ct. at 1122 (internal quotations omitted) (emphasis added). 
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lens,” the agents’ alleged intentional drafting of a false affidavit 
about known Nevada residents that wrongfully delayed the return of 
money known to belong to those residents “formed no 
jurisdictionally relevant contacts with Nevada.”76 In other words, the 
Court says that a plaintiff ’s residency, even if known, is not a 
“jurisdictionally relevant contact[]”.77 As if attempting to eradicate 
any doubt about the absolute irrelevancy of plaintiff residency, the 
Court concludes, “[I]t is the defendant, not the plaintiff . . . who 
must create contacts with the forum State.”78 The Court also states 
that the “reality” is that “none of [the agents’] challenged conduct 
had anything to do with Nevada itself.”79 However clear these 
messages may seem in isolation, when taken in the context of the 
Court’s entire opinion, the overall doctrine is far from certain. 
There are multiple times when Walden contradicts itself and 
suggests plaintiff residency is actually relevant to minimum contacts 
analysis. When the Court says “the mere fact that [defendants’] 
conduct affect[s] plaintiffs with connections to the forum State does 
not suffice to authorize jurisdiction,”80 the Court is implying that 
plaintiff residency is relevant. When the Court relies on Calder and 
says that “mere injury to a forum resident is not a sufficient 
connection to the forum,”81 the Court is implying that plaintiff 
residency is relevant. Thus, while some of Walden’s plain language 
makes no room for plaintiff residency, other language suggests 
its relevance. 
The only statement in Walden which attempts to reconcile this 
apparent friction is too vague to clarify anything meaningful—it only 
points out the obvious. The Court says the following: “To be sure, a 
defendant’s contacts with the forum State may be intertwined with 
his transactions or interactions with the plaintiff or other parties. But 
a defendant’s relationship with a plaintiff or third party, standing 
alone, is an insufficient basis for jurisdiction.”82 First, for there to be 
a lawsuit there must be some kind of interaction or transaction that 
 
 76. Id. at 1124. 
 77. Id. 
 78. Id. at 1126. 
 79. Id. at 1125. 
 80. Id. at 1126. 
 81. Id. at 1125. 
 82. Id. at 1123. 
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went sour with a party and it goes without saying that the negative 
interaction must be tied to a forum state. The question is whether a 
part of that tie to a forum state is a plaintiff ’s known residency, and 
the Court does nothing to repair its contradictory answers to that 
question. Pointing out that “a defendant’s relationship with a 
plaintiff or third party, standing alone, is an insufficient basis for 
jurisdiction,”83 is not helpful either. First, that observation is vague. 
More importantly, that observation addresses sufficiency, 
not relevancy. 
Walden leaves a mess for lower courts and litigators to grapple 
with: Are plaintiff residency and the location of damages relevant to 
personal jurisdiction analysis, or not? Some language in Walden 
implies, “Yes.” This is in harmony with well-vetted precedent that, as 
shown below, seems to make sense. However, Walden’s strongest 
language apparently rebuffs reason by saying, “No, neither plaintiff 
residency nor the location of damages is relevant.” 
B. Walden Attempts to Divorce Contacts with the State from Contacts 
with Known State Residents 
To the extent Walden is meant to preclude consideration of 
plaintiff residency, it attempts to draw an impossible line—
unsupported by precedent— between “contacts with the forum State 
itself” and “contacts with persons who reside there.”84 
Walden tries to justify its unproductive exercise of detaching a 
forum from its residents by pointing to language in both 
International Shoe and Burger King, which hardly lend the sought-
after support. First, Walden quotes from International Shoe language 
that actually says nothing about plaintiff residency: “Due process 
‘does not contemplate that a state may make binding a judgment in 
personam against an individual . . . with which the state has no 
contacts, ties, or relations.”85 The insufficiency of zero contacts says 
nothing about relevancy of any particular type of contact, including 
contact with a plaintiff. 
 
 83. Id. (emphasis added). 
 84. Id. at 1122 (“[O]ur ‘minimum contacts’ analysis looks to the defendant’s contacts 
with the forum State itself, not the defendant’s contacts with persons who reside there.”). 
 85. Id. (quoting Int’l Shoe Co. v. Wash., 326 U.S. 310, 319 (1945)). 
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Second, the Court looks to Burger King, which similarly fails to 
support a bar to consideration of plaintiff residency and instead 
focuses on the insufficiency of “random, fortuitous, or attenuated” 
contacts.86 Though there may be times when plaintiff residency is 
“random, fortuitous, or attenuated” and Burger King could be used 
to support excluding such a contact from the minimum contacts 
arithmetic, Burger King says nothing about un-random, un-
fortuitous, or un-attenuated plaintiff residency. As shown, neither 
Burger King, nor International Shoe support a wholesale divorce 
between contacts with a forum from contacts with a 
forum’s residents. 
Even if creating such a partition were justified by precedent, it 
still would not make sense to draw a distinction between a forum 
and a forum’s residents. What is a forum? Is it not, at least in part, 
logical to conclude that a forum includes the sum of its residents? 
Can a defendant affect a resident without, by extension to some 
degree, affecting the state in which that resident resides? It makes 
little sense to allow a state to claim responsibility for its residents but 
deny consideration of those relationships in minimum contacts 
analysis. It is not “unconstitutional alchemy”87 to accept residents as 
logical extensions of their states—if not residents, then with whom 
does a party interact at all? Walden outruns reason by holding that a 
false affidavit regarding known Nevada residents did not have 
“anything to do with Nevada itself.”88 
IV. WALDEN’S MESS UNAPPRECIATED 
It appears lower courts have swallowed Walden’s pitch that its 
holding did not change anything. As shown above, regardless of 
what the Court tries to say about it, there is no way “[w]ell-
established principles of personal jurisdiction [were] sufficient to 
 
 86. Id. at 1123 (quoting Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 475 (1985)). 
 87. Brief for Petitioner, Walden v. Fiore, 134 S. Ct. 1115 (2014) (No. 12-574), 2013 
LEXIS 2472, at *12–13 (“That respondents have connections with Nevada and felt harm 
there is purely incidental to petitioner’s alleged conduct. Transforming respondents’ 
connections with Nevada into connections between petitioner and Nevada is 
unconstitutional alchemy.”). 
 88. Walden, 134 S. Ct at 1125 (“[N]one of petitioner’s challenged conduct had 
anything to do with Nevada itself.”). 
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decide this case” based on the Court’s reasoning.89 Of the 195 cases 
mentioning Walden, none have criticized the ruling.90 The closest 
any court has come to rebellion is distinguishing its facts.91 In fact, at 
least one federal district court has expressly denied Walden changed 
anything: “Walden . . . left undisturbed established Supreme Court 
precedent.”92 That case is worth dissecting briefly because if the 
district court had actually appreciated Walden’s chaotic doctrinal 
narrowing of personal jurisdiction, that case likely would have flipped 
a u-ey.93 
A. Jenkins v. Miller 
Jenkins v. Miller is a federal district court case about whether a 
Vermont court should have personal jurisdiction over four out-of-
state defendants who allegedly assisted in a parental kidnapping from 
Virginia to Nicaragua.94 The four defendants’ motions to dismiss for 
lack of personal jurisdiction were previously denied, but post-
Walden, they “renewed their motions to dismiss in light of . . . 
Walden.”95 Notwithstanding Walden, the court again found personal 
jurisdiction over the four defendants under the assumption that 
Walden “left undisturbed established Supreme Court precedent, and 
[did] not dictate an alteration.”96 
1. Jenkins’s basic facts 
In Jenkins, a daughter was born into a same-sex civil union.97 
The couple soon dissolved their union and the biological mother 
 
 89. Id. at 1126. 
 90. LexisNexis Shephard’s® report run by author on January 2, 2015. 
 91. Seventeen of the 195 cases have distinguished their facts from Walden. See id. 
 92. Jenkins v. Miller, No. 2:12-cv-184, 2014 WL 3530365, at *5 (D. Vt. July 
15, 2014). 
 93. Another case worth exploring is one which came out pre-Walden and would likely 
have come out much differently post-Walden. In 2011, an Idaho district court found sufficient 
contacts over an out-of-state defendant for merely inducing independent contractors to 
abandon their contracts with an Idaho-based company. Melaleuca, Inc. v. Organo Gold Int’l, 
No. 4:10-CV-420-LMB, 2011 WL 3490244, at *5–6 (D. Idaho Aug. 9, 2011). 
 94. Jenkins, 2014 WL 3530365, at *1–5. 
 95. Id. at *1. 
 96. Id. at *5. 
 97. Id. at *1. 
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moved with her daughter from Vermont to Virginia.98 A Vermont 
court determined the parental rights of the mother and ex-partner, 
granting full custody to the mother and visitation rights to the ex-
partner.99 After a time of partial compliance with the visitation 
schedule, the biological mother allegedly fled the country with her 
daughter.100 Soon after the mother left the country with her 
daughter, the court changed the child’s custody, transferring the 
mother’s rights to her ex-partner.101 
The ex-partner subsequently sued those she believed assisted in 
the biological mother’s removal of the child from Virginia to New 
York, then to Canada, and ultimately to Nicaragua.102 Four 
defendants renewed a previously-denied motion to dismiss for lack of 
personal jurisdiction after Walden’s ruling.103 The four consisted of a 
company, the company’s president, the president’s daughter, and a 
founder of the Protect Isabella Coalition.104 A cell phone owned by 
the company and another owned by the president made the trip 
from Virginia to New York the same day the mother traveled from 
Virginia to New York.105 The president and his daughter allegedly 
called the mother’s father to set up “a rendezvous at a parking lot 
where [the mother] abandoned her car” in New York.106 The 
president also purportedly helped send money and supplies—
solicited from donors by the president’s daughter—to the mother in 
Nicaragua.107 The Coalition’s founder allegedly encouraged her to 
flee with the child and helped create a fund and a Facebook page 
devoted to supporting the idea.108 The founder also “advised anyone 
with knowledge of [the mother’s] whereabouts not to reveal it.”109 
 
 98. Id. 
 99. Id. 
 100. Id. at *1–2. 
 101. Id. at *1. 
 102. Id. at *2. 
 103. Id. at *3. 
 104. See id. at *2–3. 
 105. Id. at *2. 
 106. See id. at *3. 
 107. Id. 
 108. Id. at *2. 
 109. Id. 
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2. Jenkins’s analysis 
According to the Vermont district court, it had jurisdiction over 
the four defendants because they had “allegedly interfered with [the 
ex-partner’s] parental rights.”110 These rights “arose out of a 
Vermont civil union and subsequent Vermont Family Court 
rulings”111 and “were to be exercised in Vermont.”112 Relying on 
Calder, the court held that such “intentional and tortious out-of-
state activity” aimed at a resident and causing in-state damages 
satisfied personal jurisdiction.113 According to the court, Walden 
“presented a very different set of facts” and did not change the law 
from how it was understood under Calder.114 
3. How Jenkins actually comes out under Walden 
The Jenkins court is correct that Walden “presented a very 
different set of facts”115 but is wrong in thinking those differences 
should tip the scale toward jurisdiction under Walden. If anything, 
the differences of contacts in Jenkins would seem to justify personal 
jurisdiction even less than the insufficient contacts in Walden. In 
Walden, DEA agents’ out-of-state activities causing in-state damages 
against known state residents were insufficient to support personal 
jurisdiction.116 Unlike Walden, it is completely unestablished in 
Jenkins whether the defendants knew or had reason to know the 
plaintiff was a Vermont resident. If anything, that fact would seem to 
make the contacts more “random, fortuitous, or attenuated”117 than 
those in Walden. 
Regardless, as with the DEA agents, there do not appear to be 
any jurisdictionally relevant contacts between the alleged kidnapping 
conspirators and the forum state. According to the most 
straightforward reading of Walden, plaintiff residency is no longer 
 
 110. Id. at *5. 
 111. Id. 
 112. Id. at *4. 
 113. See id. 
 114. Id. at *5. 
 115. Id. 
 116. See supra Sections II.B.1, II.B.2. 
 117. Walden v. Fiore, 134 S. Ct. 1115, 1123 (2014) (quoting Burger King Corp. v. 
Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 475 (1985)). 
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relevant.118 The fact that the ex-partner was a Vermont resident 
should no longer have place in the post-Walden analysis. While 
personal jurisdiction over the alleged conspirators may have been 
justified pre-Walden (though still doubtful), it is reasonably clear 
that personal jurisdiction should not be possible post-Walden. It is 
not established that any of the alleged conspirators ever set foot in 
Vermont, ever sent anything to Vermont, or had any Walden-like 
contact with Vermont. All they ever did was make decisions that that 
happened to hurt someone who coincidently was a Vermont resident 
with Vermont rights. The fact that Vermont courts determined the 
plaintiff ’s rights should make no material difference after Walden 
(although it is unclear if it ever did) because the focus is now on 
what the defendants did to aim at the forum, not where the plaintiff 
happened to be or which state happened to be interested in 
protecting that plaintiff ’s rights. 
If intentionally keeping money out of the custody of its known 
rightful owners in Nevada is insufficient, then helping keep a child 
from an occasional visit to a part-time parent—who may not even be 
known to live in Vermont—should likewise be insufficient. 
Jenkins v. Miller exemplifies how dozens of courts have failed to 
appreciate Walden’s potential impact on personal jurisdiction 
analysis. While other courts have implied by their absence of criticism 
that they agree Walden did not change anything, Jenkins—which 
should have looked on Walden with a critical eye—has expressly 
argued that Walden left precedent unaltered. 
V. PLEA TO RETURN TO PRE-WALDEN ANALYSIS 
Walden should be overruled. Pre-Walden personal jurisdiction 
analysis, while far from perfect, was more helpful. Not only does 
Walden set the stage for discriminatory and unpredictable 
enforcement through its contradictions, but the opinion tends to 
minimize—perhaps even erase—the weight once rightfully given to 
damage location and contacts with people and property tied to a 
state. Giving weight to damage location and contacts with people 
and property tied to a state is in harmony with the territorial legacy 
laid down by the Court as far back as Pennoyer. Further, Walden lays 
 
 118. See supra Section III.A. 
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the foundation for absurd results, especially in light of increased 
interstate mobility. Lastly, the protocol in other countries regarding 
jurisdiction is more in line with the pre-Walden tradition. While 
other countries should not dictate United States law, American 
courts can learn from other countries and can find persuasive their 
perspectives on fairness. 
A. Walden’s Foundation for Unpredictable and Arbitrary Results 
Walden leaves a grab bag of contradictions for lower courts and 
litigators to wrestle with, especially regarding the relevance of 
plaintiff residency and damage location.119 Some language implies 
predictable plaintiff residency and damage location are relevant, but 
explicit language states they are not.120 Law should not be self-
contradictory.121 Self-contradictory law creates ambiguity. If courts 
and attorneys do not—in fact, cannot—comprehend the law because 
it is incomprehensible, there is little doubt that the law will lead to 
unpredictable and arbitrary outcomes. 
In fact, if Walden were treated as a criminal statutory law, such 
ambiguity would make it unconstitutional under the void-for-
vagueness doctrine. According to that doctrine, “Where the 
legislature fails to provide such minimal guidelines, a criminal statute 
may permit a standardless sweep that allows policemen, prosecutors, 
and juries to pursue their personal predilections.”122 Just like the 
void-for-vagueness doctrine,123 personal jurisdiction finds it roots in 
the Due Process Clause of the Constitution. There is no reason the 
United States Supreme Court should not strive for the same level of 
clarity it requires of legislatures. Just as when a legislature lays down 
incomprehensible law, the Court’s contradictory rulings “may permit 
 
 119. See supra Part IV. 
 120. See supra Section III.A. 
 121. See John Finnis, Foundations of Practical Reason Revisited, 50 AM. J. JURIS. 109, 
110 (2005) (explaining that “purportedly valid propositions of law must not contradict or be 
practically inconsistent with each other”); Marvin Zalman, et al., Michigan’s Assisted Suicide 
Three Ring Circus—An Intersection of Law and Politics, 23 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 863, 900 
n.174 (1997) (stating that rules should be “understandable, must not be contradicted by 
overlapping law, [and] must not require the impossible”). 
 122. Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 358 (1983) (internal quotations omitted). 
 123. Id. at 353 (“We conclude that the statute as it has been construed is 
unconstitutionally vague within the meaning of the Due Process Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment . . .”). 
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a standardless sweep” that allows lower courts and attorneys to 
“pursue their personal predilections.”124 
B. Minimum Contacts Should Consider Predictable Damage to 
Plaintiff Residents and Property 
Though Walden leaves ambiguity regarding the relevance of 
plaintiff residency, property tied to a state, or the presence of 
damages in a state, Walden’s strongest language seems to indicate 
their irrelevance.125 This not only contradicts precedent,126 but 
specifically seems to run counter to the territoriality principles in 
Pennoyer v. Neff, which provided the backbone of personal 
jurisdiction analysis for nearly seventy years.127 Moreover, ignoring 
contacts with people, property, and damages tied to a state could 
lead to absurd results. Lastly, looking to other countries indicates no 
widespread belief that considering such contacts would be unfair. 
1. The territoriality principle of personal jurisdiction supports 
considering such factors 
Personal jurisdiction over an out-of-state defendant once strictly 
required the defendant’s “presence within the court’s territorial 
jurisdiction.”128 Presence could be satisfied by service of process on 
the defendant while within the state or could be indicated by the 
defendant’s ownership of property in the state, though such presence 
would only justify jurisdiction up to the value of that property.129 
This was the law from at least Pennoyer v. Neff130 in 1878 until 
International Shoe Co. v. Washington131 in 1945—spanning nearly 
seven decades. 
International Shoe did not eliminate the relevance of defendant 
presence within a state territory, but no longer considered presence a 
 
 124. Id. at 358 (internal quotations omitted). 
 125. See supra Section III.A. 
 126. See supra Part II, Section III.B. 
 127. See infra Section V.B.1. 
 128. Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 186 (1977) (citing Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 
714 (1878)). 
 129. Pennoyer, 95 U.S. at 725, 733–34. 
 130. Id. 
 131. Int’l Shoe Co. v. Wash., 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945). 
06.BALINSKI.FIN (DO NOT DELETE) 8/4/2016  6:39 PM 
683 Wonky Walden 
 705 
strict requirement, instead allowing jurisdiction in its absence if the 
defendant had “minimum contacts with [a state] such that the 
maintenance of the suit does not offend traditional notions of fair 
play and substantial justice.”132 International Shoe became the basic 
framework upon which much personal jurisdiction analysis over out-
of-state defendants has since been built.133 One way of looking at it is 
that International Shoe simply expanded Pennoyer’s meaning of 
“presence” under the territoriality principle to include other ways a 
defendant can touch a state without physically being or owning 
property there.  
Based on the territoriality principle of jurisdiction, and as 
recently as 1990, the Court found minimum contacts satisfied when 
a defendant merely stepped foot into a state for something entirely 
unrelated to a lawsuit because the plaintiff managed to track down 
the defendant and serve him process while he was there.134 Given the 
increased interstate mobility of people and things owing to advances 
in technology and infrastructure, this type of transient or ambush 
jurisdiction seems more “random, fortuitous, or attenuated”135 than 
reasonable. A single layover in a state could satisfy minimum contacts 
so long as the plaintiff is opportunist enough to serve a defendant 
walking from gate to gate. It is true that if a defendant could travel 
to the state once, the defendant could likely travel there again 
without too much inconvenience, but given modern circumstances 
the same could be true for any state. Most of the time, there is little 
difference in the time and expense required of a defendant to fly to 
one state versus another.136 
Compared with ambush jurisdiction, it is far more reasonable to 
subject a defendant to the jurisdiction of a state which that 
 
 132. Id. (internal quotations omitted). 
 133. See Ralph U. Whitten, Exporting and Importing Domestic Partnerships: Some 
Conflict-of-Laws Questions and Concerns, 2001 BYU L. REV. 1235, 1243 (2001); Brian L. 
Hazen, Comment, Rethinking the Dormant Commerce Clause: The Supreme Court as Catalyst 
for Spurring Legislative Gridlock in State Income Tax Reform, 2013 BYU L. Rev. 1021, 
1028 (2013). 
 134. Burnham v. Superior Court of Cal., 495 U.S. 604, 607–28 (1990). 
   135. Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 475 (1985). 
 136. See Gray v. Am. Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 176 N.E.2d 761, 766 (1961) 
(“[T]oday’s facilities for transportation and communication have removed much of the 
difficulty and inconvenience formerly encountered in defending lawsuits brought in 
other States.”). 
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defendant has knowingly touched in a way related to the lawsuit. 
Interacting with a person who resides in a state or property 
belonging to a person who resides in a state, or causing injury to 
people or property within a state, should all be considered relevant 
contacts that may add up to “presence” under International Shoe. 
They should not be minimized or rejected as in Walden. This should 
be especially true when the defendant knows or has reason to know 
of the state ties. After all, people and property are basically 
appendages to a state and a state has interest in protecting and 
governing them. 
Of course, plaintiff residency and damage location should not 
always carry equal weight. Like Burger King says, “‘random,’ 
‘fortuitous,’ or ‘attenuated’” contacts should carry little, if any, 
weight and that doctrine should not carve an exception for plaintiff 
residency.137 For example, plaintiff residency unlikely to be known to 
the defendant at the time of the acts giving rise to injury should not 
matter much. Also, if residency merely results from a plaintiff ’s post-
injury unilateral move, that contact should not matter.138 However, 
where residency exists and the defendant knows or has reason to 
know of it at the time of the alleged wrongful acts, plaintiff residency 
should not be shrugged off as irrelevant to the minimum contacts 
inquiry. Also, just because a defendant does not personally care 
where he is inflicting injury does not make the predictable location 
of that injury incidental. 
2. Ignoring plaintiff residency and damage location could lead to 
absurd results 
While there is nothing fundamentally unfair about considering 
such factors, if courts turn a blind eye to contacts based on where 
plaintiffs or their property belong, or where damages occur, 
absurdities will likely result. The following three fact patterns 
are illustrative. 
 
   137. Burger King, 471 U.S. at 475. 
 138. See, e.g., Rush v. Savchuk, 444 U.S. 320, 322–23, 329 (1980) (illustrating that 
plaintiff’s unilateral post-incident move cannot tie a defendant to that new state). 
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First, consider a recent Tenth Circuit decision that relied on 
Walden139 and came to an absurd conclusion. A Utah financial 
company relied on an opinion letter from a New Hampshire law 
firm.140 The letter allegedly “contained falsehoods” and caused 
economic damage in Utah.141 The New Hampshire firm knew that 
the financial company requesting the opinion letter was based in 
Utah.142 The firm had been informed that the company was 
organized under Utah law.143 The firm recognized the company as 
being “a Utah company” and having a Utah address.144 The firm had 
discussed the letter over the phone with the Utah company and 
ultimately sent the opinion letter to the corresponding 
Utah address.145 
The Tenth Circuit held that the New Hampshire firm’s ties to 
Utah “[did] not suffice under Walden v. Fiore . . . .”146 The Tenth 
Circuit justified its ruling by explaining, “Walden teaches that 
personal jurisdiction cannot be based on interaction with a plaintiff 
known to bear a strong connection to the forum state.”147 In other 
words, a firm’s setting up a transaction with a known Utah resident, 
sending the agreed-upon product into Utah, and causing injury 
through that product is insufficient to justify haling the firm into a 
Utah court. That means if the Utah company wants relief, it must 
now likely travel across the country and litigate in New Hampshire. 
Second, consider a hypothetical car stolen from its owner in 
Nevada and driven to Georgia, where it is illegally sold. The buyer, 
who has never been to Nevada, is told that the car was stolen. Before 
buying the car, the buyer noticed the Nevada plates. Even though 
the buyer had reason to believe he was perpetuating injury in Nevada 
by taking property that belonged in Nevada, the original owner 
 
 139. Rockwood Select Asset Fund XI (6)–1, LLC v. Devine, Millimet & Branch, 750 
F.3d 1178, 1179 (10th Cir. 2014) (“We conclude that Devine’s contacts with Utah were 
insufficient under . . . Walden v. Fiore . . . .”). Though the court relied on Walden, it did not 
seem to indicate that it thought Walden was teaching anything new. 
 140. Id. 
 141. Id. at 1179–80. 
 142. Id. at 1180. 
 143. Id. 
 144. Id. 
 145. Id. 
 146. Id. 
 147. Id. 
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could not hale the buyer into a Nevada court. If the owner were to 
find his car and the illegal buyer in Georgia, the only likely avenue 
for relief would be for him to bring suit in a forum over 2000 miles 
from his home. To make this hypothetical more absurd (and more 
analogous to what happened in Walden), imagine that instead of the 
buyer simply noticing the plates, the seller actually told the buyer 
where the owner of the vehicle resided. Would it not be more 
reasonable and fair for the defendant to be haled to court in 
Nevada—where the owner is known to live and where the car is 
known to belong—than to require the plaintiff to bring suit 
in Georgia? 
Third, consider a hypothetical similar to Jenkins v. Miller, but 
with additional facts to make the point clearer. Let’s say the ex-
partner living in Vermont received custody of the daughter prior to 
her alleged kidnapping from Virginia. Additionally, imagine that 
those accused of aiding and abetting the kidnapping, while never 
having been in Vermont, knew the daughter belonged in Vermont in 
the custody of the ex-partner. The abettors knew they were causing 
injury in Vermont and that was their intention. Would it not be 
more reasonable and fair for the abettors to be haled into court in 
Vermont than to require the mother to bring suit in whatever state 
the abettors happened to reside in or whatever state the daughter 
happened to have been abducted in? 
There is nothing absurd about weighing where plaintiffs live or 
where harm occurs in minimum contacts analysis, but ignoring such 
factors may be a recipe for injustice, as illustrated by the above 
fact patterns. 
3. Domestic law in other Western countries supports such considerations 
Western peers, like Canada and England, give weight to plaintiff 
residency and the location of damages when determining personal 
jurisdiction under domestic law. International peer pressure alone 
should not be dispositive in pushing United States courts one way or 
the other, but it should be persuasive. “As commerce, and therefore 
litigation, becomes more international in character, American 
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personal jurisdiction . . . rules must be reassessed and perhaps 
harmonized with corresponding rules in other countries.”148 
 a. Plaintiff residency and the location of damages weigh heavily in 
the Canadian personal jurisdiction analysis. Canada does not find it 
fundamentally unfair to hale defendants to a forum, even if the 
defendant “has little or no connection to the forum” beyond the 
plaintiff’s own ties.149 Also, “as long as damages were suffered in 
the . . . jurisdiction,” the court is permitted to hale a defendant, 
“even if the defendant ha[s] no other contacts with that 
jurisdiction.”150 “[B]ecause damage is an essential element of any 
tort, if the damages complained of occurred in the forum, the tort is 
deemed to have been committed in the forum, regardless of whether 
the actual tortious conduct occurred somewhere else.”151 
While Canada does not label defendants’ rights as stemming 
from due process, Canada does require that lawsuits proceed “in 
accordance with the principles of fundamental justice for the 
determination of [defendants’] rights and obligations.”152 Since 
“[t]he United States and Canada enjoy perhaps the closest 
economic, cultural, and political ties of any other neighboring 
countries in the world,”153 United States courts should not ignore 
Canada’s administration of “principles of fundamental justice” in 
their own “due process” determinations. 
 b. The location of damages suffices in England. As in the United 
States, British law explicitly includes “due process” in its 
vocabulary.154 In England’s protection of the right that “[n]one shall 
be put to answer without due Process of Law,”155 it has no problem 
 
 148. Henry H. Perritt, Jr., Jurisdiction in Cyberspace, 41 VILL. L. REV. 1, 9 (1996). 
 149. Stephen J. Maddex, The Law of Personal Jurisdiction in Canada: How U.S. 
Defendants Can Be Haled Into Court in Canada . . . And Never See It Coming, 
TERRALEX.ORG (Jun. 5, 2009), www.terralex.org/publication/4bc381f127. 
 150. Id. 
 151. Id. (citing Furlan v. Shell Oil Co., 2000 BCCA 404 (Can.)). 
 152. Canadian Bill of Rights, S.C. 1960, c 44, § I(2)(e), http://laws-
lois.justice.gc.ca/eng/acts/C-12.3/FullText.html. 
 153. Maddex, supra note 149. 
 154. Observance of Due Process of Law 1368, 42 Edw. 3 c. 3 (U.K.), 
www.legislation. gov.uk/aep/Edw3/42/3/section/III. 
 155. Id. 
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with calling non-resident defendants to task in tort actions, so long 
as “damage was suffered” in the forum.156 Though the exact meaning 
of “due process” in England may not align completely with the 
meaning attached to those words in the United States, England’s 
personal jurisdiction analysis is still persuasive evidence that there is 
nothing inherently unfair about haling a defendant to a forum where 
he has intentionally caused injury. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Instead of offering welcome clarity to personal jurisdiction 
obscurity, or even leaving the status quo, Walden v. Fiore created new 
twists and turns in the minimum contacts maze. After Walden, the 
proper role of plaintiff residency and the location of damages is an 
enigma. To the extent Walden’s language seems clear, it appears to 
contradict commonsensical precedent at home and abroad, 
attempting to divorce people and property from the state they call 
home. To date, both courts and commentators have failed to 
appreciate Walden’s impact. Walden should not be ignored, nor 
should Walden be merely mentioned in passing as if benign: Walden 
should be overruled. 
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